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SOCIETAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL REFORM: 
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE 1990s 
Dr Wong Yiu-chung 
Abstrαct 
On 28 September 1995, Jiang Zemin delivered one of the most 
important speeches in his tenure as the General Secretary of the CCP 
in the Fi丘h Plenum of 14th CCP Congress, which is entitled “To 
Handle Correctly Certain Relationships in the Process of Socialist 
Modernization Construction". On the top of the agenda was the 
relationships between reform, development and stability. To him, 
reform, in particular economic reform, must be pursued; 
development is the enhancing of national strength and stability is the 
pre-condition of development. Indeed, it is the equilibrium of these 
three sets of relationships that the CCP leadership strove for that 
shaped the major forces of dynamics of Chinese politics in the 1990s. 
The leadership 's overriding concern was stability of the regime. 
Economic reform, with a temporary haul in the early 1990s, was 
accelerated and culminated in the accession to the WTO, resulting 
increasing absorption into world economy. Political reform was 
considered secondary to economic reform and it was perceived to be 
an inherently destabilizing process and any measures that would 
cause controversies within the Party were to be shelved. Leaming 
the lessons 企om the 4 June crackdown, ideological control was 
exercised unrelentingly and dissidents intellectuals were punished 
severely. Administrative streamlining was carried out two times in 
the 1990s. Grass-root democracy was instituted and anti-corruption 
drives waged but organized opposition was crushed mercilessly. So 
were the ideological debates within the Party. The result was that 
China's economic growth atlained admirable figures and it was 
rapidly becoming a powerful economic house. However, behind the 
growth phenomena, lies the abject poverty of the peasantry, massive 
unemployment, labor unrest, frustrated intellectuals and rampant 
corruption. Among the liberal intellectuals, the consensus was that 
onlya genuine political reform program could alleviate the problems 
that the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao new leadership is encountering. 
Despite the political reform in several important area, however, 
China po1itica1 reform programs have not surpassed the speech on 
cadre and 1eadership by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, supposed1y the 
most comprehensive politica1 reform b1ueprint in the reform era. 
"About the political structural r，φrm， (ou吵 greatest goal is to 
αchieve a stable enνironment. 1 talk with the Americans, the highest 
interest for China is stability." 16 June 1989 Deng Xiaoping 
( 1993:313) 
Introduction 
The 1980s began with the most comprehensive politica1 reform 
packages ever devised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
announced by Deng Xiaoping in August 1980 in the expanded 
meeting of the CCP Po1itburo but ended with the massive purges of 
the 1ibera1 intellectua1s and reformist 1eadership. The 1990s started 
with politica1 stagnation in the aftermath of the June 4 b100dbath but 
ended, ideo1ogically, with the exposition of a new theory for the CCP, 
the so- called ‘Theory of Three Represents' in 2000 by Jiang Zemin. 
lt 100ks as if the cycles of reform had emerged again. In fact, it has 
not. The pendu1um shift of policies from one extreme to another 
disappeared in the 1990s.1 Deng died in February 1997, five months 
before the historic handover of Hong Kong to China by the British 
govemment. Due to his fai1ing health, Deng had gradually 10st 
po1itica1 inf1uence since the 14th CCP Congress in 1992. The 1990s , 
especially the 1atter pa此， were dominated most1y by the persona1ity 
of Jiang Zemin (Willy Lam 1999:13-18). At the .16th CCP Congress, 
his ‘Theory of Three Represents' was inserted into the CCP 
Constitution and recognized by the whole party to be a further 
development of Deng Xiaoping Theory. On 28 September 1995, 
Jiang Zemin delivered one of the most important speeches in his 
tenure as the Genera1 Secretary of the CCP at the Fifth P1enum of 
14th CCP Congress , which was entitled “To Handle Correct1y Certain 
Re1ationships in the Process of Socialist Modernization 
Construction". At the top of the agenda was the re1ationships 
between reform, development and stabi1ity. According to the top 
1eadership, reform, in particu1ar economic reform, must be pursued; 
deve10pment is the enhancing of national strength and stability is the 
pre-condition of development. Indeed, it is the CCP leadership's 
search for equilibrium in these three sets of relationships that shaped 
the major forces and dynamics of Chinese politics in the 1990s. 
Against this background, this chapter attempts to capture the pattern 
of political development in the 1990s in general and the political 
structural reform in particular. 
Tightening Ideological Control 
In the aftermath of the 4 June massacre, when Deng Xiaoping 
(1 993 :287,290,306) said that the greatest failure in the reform era 
was in education, he did not mean education in the traditional sense , 
such as knowledge acquisition, skill dissemination and moral 
imbuing process. What he meant was, in fact, the failure in the 
CCP's ideological indoctrination in the education sectors , 
particularly among the university students. For, after all it was the 
university students who initiated the 4 June pro-democracy 
movement after the death of Hu Yaobang. In his view, the lack of 
ideological control had led to the spread of the so-called bourgeois 
liberalization and indirectly to the split of top CCP leadership and 
the ensuing chaos following the death of Hu Yaobang on 15 April 
1989. The top leadership has learnt two important lessons from the 4 
June bloodshed. First, knowing the full impact of powerful modem 
mass media, the conservative leadership realized . that strict 
ideological censorship must be exercised upon the reformist 
intellectuals , and second, a leadership split at the top must be 
avoided at all costs for the split would endanger societal stability and 
threaten the CCP directly. These are the lessons that the CCP 
leadership is still taking in the 21 5t century. 
Jiang Zemin ascended to power in the midst of 4 June purges , 
and he was involved in the decision-making process even before the 
curfew was imposed on 20 May 1989 (Nathan and Link 2001). His 
crackdown on Shanghai's World Economic Herald pleased the 
hard-line leadership. In essence, Jiang was a conservative man 
(Willy Lam 1999: 12-18). Having become the general secretary of 
the CCP, he quickly shifted econOlnic policies to the left. On one 
occasion, he asserted that the CCP would make individual 
enterprises bankrupt. His speeches were full of leftist rhetoric (1 989a; 
1989b; 1990). A丘er the crackdown, the terrn ‘political structural 
reform' virtually became a taboo and it was banned in the mass 
media for almost half a year. Starting in late 1989, however, the term 
began to reappear in the newspapers and gradually in Party 
documents and policy announcements. However, the term was 
used with a different connotation. With the crumbling of the 
communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries, the CCP was determined to strengthen the Party authority 
and fostered government administrative and extractive capacities. In 
the mean time, premier Li Peng stated that political structural reform 
had never stopped (1991). A condition had been attached to the 
political structural reform, that is societal stability. The CCP 
leadership tried now to refocus the contents of the political structural 
reform by using the term ‘political reform with Chinese 
characteristics'. Li Peng (1 991) stressed that ‘political restructuring 
should be conducive to the stability and prosperity of the country 
rather causing social disturbance.' Jiang Zemin considered that the 
political structural reform should perfect socialist democracy and 
legal system. He emphasized that Westem ideas of democracy and 
freedom were not compatible with China's ‘national conditions'. He 
added that “The (political structural reforrn) must be commensurate 
with the country's tradition, history, culture, and the development 
levels of education and theeconomy." (in Willy Lam, 1995: 242) 
Furthermore, in the commemorative speech on the seventieth 
anniversary of the CCP, in outlining the ‘socialist politics with 
Chinese characteristics' , Jiang Zemin (1991) declared that there 
must be a ‘three insistence and three nos' policy' , 
We must insist on the people's democracy dictatorship, led by 
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and 
peasants; we must not weaken and abandon the people's 
democracy dictatorship. We must insist and try to perfect the 
NPC system and must not set up a system similar to Western 
parliament. We must insist and perfect the multi party 
cooperative system led by the CCP; we must not weaken or 
negate the leadership of the CCP and adopt a Western type 
multi party system (師告n Wei Po, 2 July 1991). 
In early 1995 , Jiang pronounced that a loyal CCP member must 
be able to distinguish the seven differentials between Marxism 
and adulterated M訂幻sm or bourgeois liberalization (Mirror June 
1996:22). The seven contrasting pair of concepts are as follows: 
First, the true Marxism must not be confused with anti-Marxism 
or pseudo- Marxism. Second, the socialist economy versus 
private ownership; third, socialist democracy versus Westem 
parliamentary democracy; fourth, dialectical materialism versus 
subjective metaphysics; fifth, socialism versus feudalism; sixth, 
learning advanced things from the West versus blind worship of 
the Western; finally, civilized and healthy style of lifestyle versus 
a negative, decadent lifestyle. 
In the wake of the 1989 crackdown, to protect himself from the 
ultra-leftist attacks, Jiang had put forward a theory of Sumames: the 
nature of refonn should be defined as either socialist or capitalist. 
Reform capped with capitalist would be purged. With this move, the 
conservative leadership would characterize all the reforms during 
Hu-Zhao era as ‘capitalist' and China's reform and the open era 
would end. However, doctrinal purity was rejected by Deng 
Xiaoping, who, on the contrary, formulated a theory of ‘three 
favorables': raising productivity, boosting the people 's standard of 
living, and elevating the comprehensive strength of the nation 
(Mirror April 1992:24-25). Any policy or measure that would be 
favorable to the three tasks would be considered ‘socialist\This was 
the further development of his thesis of black cats and white cats. 
Having lost two of his most intimate proteges in two years and 
surrounded by bundles of conservatives, Deng began to be impatient 
about the pace of economic reform (Mirror January 1991: 30-31; 
February 1991 :26-27). He planned to restart the reform engine. 
However, throughout the 1990s, the strategy that economic reform 
preceded political structural reform remained the cardinal principle. 
After the suppression of the pro-democracy movement, the CCP 
obviously encountered another major legitimacy cnSlS which, to 
Deng Xiaoping's mind, could only be saved by more radical 
economic reform (De時 1993 :307). 
Despite the political setbacks, Deng's determination to pursue 
economic reform remained unshaken. In the second half of 1990, he 
allied with Shanghai Party secretary Zhu Ronji, to publish a series of 
commentaries (pen name Wang Puping), criticizing the conservative 
backlash and insisting on the importance of the reform policies. At 
the same time, Deng formulated 'no controversies' to advance 
economic reform (Mirror April 1991 :28-29). The series of tactical 
moves culminated in the trip to the Southem provinces (Nanxun) , 
which successfully tumed Jiang into a reformist, at least in the 
economic arena. The victory of the Southern trip by Deng was 
manifested in the 14th CCP Congress Political Report made by Jiang 
(1 992). Ideologically, the Party should put its focus on anti-leftism 
and economically, the establishment of a socialist market economy 
was called for. 
Riding with the wind of changes, the non-establishment 
intellectuals headed by Yuan Hongbing, a Beida lecturer, published 
an edited anti-leftism volume titled Lishi de Chaoliu (Currents of 
Hist。可r). Hu Jiw缸， former editor-in-chief of People 50 Dai鈔， was one 
of the writers. As soon as it was published, it was banned by the 
Propaganda Department of the CCP. The book was charged with 
three crimes. First, the essays were edited and written by the 
activists in the 4 June events; second, this was a counter-attack by 
the bourgeois rightist using Deng's southern trip as an excuse; third, 
the book revealed the problems between two views of reform 
(Mirror June 1992:37-38). Not content with the ban, Yuan Hongbing 
organized an academic forum titled “Reform and Open Door Policy, 
Strengthening the Country, Enriching the People" at which more 
than a hundred of intellectuals including some writers of the volume 
and other reformist intellectuals such as Wang Ruishui participated. 
In a speech, Wang said that, in the reign of Maoist rule, leftism was 
the main current of . thoughts, and this had destroyed China's 
development for almost twenty years. Deng had reversed the leftist 
trend by emphasizing reform but the habitual influence would not 
eradicated so easily (Mirror July 1992:44-47). In the three years 
since 4 June crackdown, this was the first time for a spontaneous 
gathering organized by non-establishment intellectuals. The 
conservative force strongly condemned the forum and Deng Liqun 
personally attacked Yuan Hongbing for committing bourgeois 
liberalization, a great crime after 4 June (Mirror July 1992:30). On 
the eve of 14th CCP Congress, a group of respectable writers 
inc1uding Ba Jin, Wang Meng, Hu Jiw缸， Yu Guangyuan and Sha 
Yiexin, etc. published a volume entitled Fang Zuo Beiwanglu 
(Memorandum on Preventing Leftism) and the literary monthly 
Chinese Writers organized a forum in June and published the 
speeches in the magazine. The focus was on “ eliminating the leftist 
obstacles, literary writings can flourish" (Nineties January 
1993:47-48). It was banned soon and the forum was attacked. 
In the aftermath of the 14th CCP Congress, the top leadership 
reached three points of consensus: first, quickening the process of 
reform; second, shelving political reform measures and third, 
tightening ideological contro l. In maintaining political stability, the 
Propaganda Department established an ideological monitoring unit 
consisting of fifty personnel to examine materials in the mass media 
位 the centrallevel (Mirror June 1993 :28-29) 
Clearly, the new CCP leadership was wary of spontaneous 
moves that were not controlled by the Party, even though they were 
critical of conservative forces. Despite the harsh measures, the 
non-official intellectuals tried to push political reform by petitions to 
the top leadership. One of the earliest a吐empts was organized by 
Chen Zimin who allied with eleven famous intellectuals, including 
Liu Xiaobo, a literary critic and Chen Xiaoping, a legal expert. On 
25 February 1995, the group sent the petition, together with twelve 
signatures, to the NPC. The gist of their petition was to demand that 
the CCP curtail the rampant corruption. By writing a topic that was 
the concern of the nation, they hoped that their petition would not be 
perceived as a threat to the leadership. Following the first petition, it 
was followed by two other petitions. On 28 February 1995 , the 
student leader Wang Dang took the lead of organizing a petition, 
signed by 22 people, demanding the CCP abolish the labor camp 
system. On 2 March, Chen Zimin group also sent their second 
petition to the Party, demanding the Party to “preserve personal 
freedom of citizens and abolish security detention" (Nineties April 
1995:29-31). 
The second wave of petition was sparked by the external events. 
1995 was the year designated by the United Nations to be the Year of 
Tolerance. Echoing the appeal, on 15 May 1995 , Xu Liangying, a 
veteran scientist in the Academy of Science, organized a petition 
signed by 45 intellectuals. The petition raised three demands: first, to 
stop suppressing so- called ideological enemies, observing strictly 
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the freedom of thought and religious beliefs; second, to launch a 
re-evaluation of the 4 June events and release all prisoners arising 
from 4 June events; third, to release all prisoners and detainees 
because of their thought or writings. Most surprisingly, the petition 
was headed by Wang Ganchang, one of the foremost nuclear 
physicists in China. On the eve of the sixth anniversaηr of 4 June 
crackdown, Wang Zhihong, wife of Chen Zimin, and 52 others wrote 
an appealletter titled “To learn lessons of blood and pushing forward 
democratic and legal processes". The letter demanded the CCP 
should enact a series of legal codes to ensure the protection of 
human rights for the citizens, which included Law of the Press, Law 
of Assembly, Law of Constitutional Court and finally publish a 
declaration of human rights and human freedom (Nineties June 
1995:76-79). 
Again, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the 4 June events , 
105 victims' families , notably among them was former professor of 
the People's University Ding Zilin, launched prosecution charges 
against premier Li Peng who violated the principles of protecting 
human life and freedom inherent in the Chinese constitution, United 
Nations Charter and the Intemational Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights which China had signed in the previous ye位 (Open July 
1999:8-9). All these petitions and letters certainly fell on deaf ears. 
Not only did the CCP not accept their moderate demands, but they 
were instead harassed (Chen Zimin), exiled (Wang Dang), kept 
under surveillance (Ding Zilin), and made to recant (Wang 
Ganchang). 
Apart from petitions from so.cietal sectors (from the so- called 
right), there were petitions or appeals from the ‘left' , coming notably 
from Deng Liqun, once the underground general secretary in the 
mid-1980s. In late 1995, the neo-Maoists circulated a ‘Ten-thousand 
Character' petition titled “Certain Factors that Affect out National 
Security" among senior cadres, attacking marketization as if would 
undercut the basis of socialism and would lead to the demise of the 
CCP. It raised the specter of “the substitution of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat with the open and direct dictatorship of the 
capitalists." (Willy Lam 1999:364). In early 1996, the neo-Maoists 
circulated another petition, waming of the emergence of a 
‘Gorbachev-type' of leadership within the Party. It further warned 
that ‘peaceful evolution' was highly possible in China and the West 
was looking for its representatives in China and neo-capitalists were 
becoming a class (Open May 1996:18-19). In March 1997, Deng 
Liqun and his associates circulated the third petition titled “Certain 
Theoretical and Policy Problems Concerning Insisting the Status of 
Public Ownership", in an attempt to in f1uence the agenda ofthe CCP 
Congress held later in 1997. As the title suggested, the focus of the 
petition was exclusively on the importance of public ownership. It 
asserted that “without the guiding status of the public ownership and 
national economy, there would not be socia1ism with Chinese 
characteristics" and it furth叮叮gued that “ if the guiding status of the 
public ownership was lost, then the economic basis of the ruling 
CCP would be gone and classes would be polarized. The state would 
become the appendage of the international capitalism." (Open March 
1997:54-61). 
These orthodox Marxist treatises had little influence even in the 
Party. More in f1uential was the rise of neo-conservatives. The origin 
of neo-conservatism can be dated back to the neo-authoritarianism in 
the 1980s (Kalpana Misra 1998: 208-209). Joseph Fewsmith has 
captured the spirit of the neo-conservatism by defining it as follows: 
“(It) indicated a desire to find a middle path between the traditional 
conservatism of the Old Left (as examplified ideologically by more 
orthodox Marxist-Leninists such as Chen Yun) and ‘radical 
reformers' (as epitomized culturally by the film River Elegy and 
economically by advocates of privatization). In general, 
neo-conservatism accepted market economics, albeit with some 
caveats, but desired a greater role for the state."(Fewsmith 2001 :80). 
Fewsmith was right when he po.inted out the middle ground position 
of the ideological orientation of the neo-conservatism but he was 
wrong when he said the position". . .. must be understood as a loose 
term, indicating a set of concerns and a broad intellectual orientation 
rather than a well developed and consistent body of thought" 
(Fewsmith 2001: 80). By the beginning of the 21 st century, 
neo-conservatism or the new Left, together with liberalism, had 
developed into the two main coherent and consistent bodies of 
thoughts covering analyses on aspects such as the nature of Chinese 
society, the nature of Chinese state, the notion of social justice, the 
views on international situati 
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the developmental goal for China? the nature of civil society, the 
role of e在iciency or equality, the notion of revolution or reform or 
tradition, the nature of modemity, etc (Ming Pao Monthly May 2002: 
33-40; Open June 1995: 48-52; Open December 1999:51-53). 
The ideas of neo-conservatism were first systemically 
expounded by a group of young intellectuals associated with China 
Youth Daily in the a缸ermath of the failed Soviet coup in August 
1991(Fewsmith 200 1: 98-100). They circulated a paper entitled 
“Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China a丘er the 
Soviet Upheaval". The monograph was associated with some 
princelings such as Chen Yuan, son of Chen Yun, and Pan Yue, the 
son- in- law of Liu Huaqing. The gist of the tract was to attack 
both ideological extremes, the so-called ζutopian socialism' and 
‘utopian capitalism' , and strive for a middle ground. The central 
concern was to how the CCP had changed from a revolutionary party 
to a ruling party. They were certainly for the continuous governance 
of the CCP but they were concemed about how politically stability 
could be maintained. The theses were repeated when Pan Yue 
submitted a paper on the changing status of the CCP in the late 
1990s (Open July 2001:28-38). In retrospect, the paper was ignored 
by the Jiang-Zhu leadership. 
Sha Yiexin, a veteran drama script writer, pointed out that the 
propaganda machine of the CCP had four features. First, the Party is 
supreme. According to the “Theory of Three Represents", the Party 
represents the whole nation and therefore could not be criticized. 
Second, the uniformity of public opinion, so it allows no dissenting 
voice. Third, all mass media are the mouthpiece of the Party/state. 
F ourth, no law would be passed to govern mass media. The late 
Chen Yun had told the following to the party members: “In KMT 
period, they had passed a press law. We studied it and made use of 
its loopholes. Now we don't have to pass the law. We could do 
whatever we like" (Open September 2003: 89-91). 
China claims publicly that there is no press censorship but, in 
fact, the censorship is most rigorous. All the propaganda 
departments of the Party Committees at various levels exercise 
censorship. Furthermore, the Party Committees in the mass media 
also exercise censorship and more sensitive materials would be 
submitted to the Propaganda Ministry of the CCP for decision. After 
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the reform policies were launched, control began to loosen. Since the 
Fourteenth CCP Congress, the Propaganda 孔1inistry set up a “Press 
News Reading and Assessment Coordinating Unit" to exercise 
contro l. After the Fifteenth CCP Congress, the Ministry instructed 
different provinces and cities to set up “Reading and Assessment 
Teams" to serve as censorship units. The result was a long list of 
banned books, joumals and magazines. Numerous editors and 
publishers were wamed, penalized and driven out from the 
professions (Open August 2003: 83 -89)? 
Suppressing Organized Opposition 
The CCP is a highly unified Party/state/ military structure. 
Despite the incessant ideological and political conflicts within the 
p叮叮， it has never allowed external political societal forces to grow 
unhindered even in the reform era. Along with the marketization of 
the economy, the coercion over the society has shrunken 
considerably but the CCP has never tolerated organized opposition 
or even potential organized forces. The 4 June events certainly 
taught the Party a good lesson. “Nipping the disturbances in the bud" 
的 the former Beijing mayor Chen Xitong said. ln fact, this has been 
the guiding principle in tackling the non- CCP forces in the past two 
decades. Even in economic corporations, the Party very often 
occupies the dominant position. More recently, the Party called for 
the revival of the Party cells in all economic enterprises, even under 
the relatively relaxed climate of Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao new 
leadership (Ming Pαo 20 August 2003).3 
The harsh crackdown in the aftermath of the 4 June killings 
silenced all political dissent within the Party as well as outside. 
ldeological旬， the elites became more conservative and calling for 
stability became the focus of the regime efforts. In early 1992, 4 
June student leaders Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng were given 
medical parole. As the final lntemational Olympic Committee vote 
approached in September veteran activists Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli 
and Wang Juntao were freed in a move to impress upon the 
Olypmpic Committee members Beijing's good wi I1 in observing 
human rights. But the activists had not organized together then and 
they were only marginally connected with each other (Teresa Wright 
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2002: 907-908). After the failure of the bid to host the ye前 2000
Olympics, the political climate became tense again and the activities 
of the dissenters became more intense, so the oppression came and 
Wei and Wang were arrested again. 
ln the late 1990s, the external environment provided a fertile 
soil again for the development of the dissent. ln 1997, China signed 
the lnternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
The US president Clinton was planning a visit to China in June 1998 
and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson 
came to China in September 1998. ln October, China signed the 
lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ln the 
meantime, internally, the ‘counter-revolutionary' c1ause was repealed 
by the NPC in March and substituted by the c1ause of ‘national 
security' , a move showing the continuing de-ideologization of the 
CCP. ln September the same year, the Fifteen CCP Congress called 
for the need to rule by law and made references, for the first time, to 
human rights. Under the relaxed c1imate, Wang Youc缸， one of the 
1989 student leaders, had the idea forming an opposition party and 
he was perhaps influenced by Wang Bingzhang who was the founder 
of China Spring and had earlier slipped into China to contact 
dissidents in early 1998. He was found and expelled. Wang and his 
friends in Hangzhou decided to announce the news on the eve of 
Clinton's visit, hoping that the timing would preclude official 
suppression. On 25 June, the group presented an “Open Dec1aration 
of the Establishment of the China Democracy Party (CDP) Zhejiang 
Preparatory Committee" and a draft constitution. The aim of CDP 
was to “establish a constitutional democratic political system" and 
peaceful means must be used in processes. The group “opposes 
terrorist activities" (Teresa Wright 2002:910). Subsequently, 
preparatory committees began to fonn in twenty- four provinces and 
cltles. 
The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the 
right to form political parties but no legal procedures had been 
developed in China to establish the status. The preparatory 
committee of the CDP tried to test the official limit by applying for a 
legal status at the Zhejiang provincial civil affairs bureau. 
Surprisingly, the bureau accepted the application. But later Wang 
was detained and interrogated. He was told his application was 
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rejected. In the following months, five provincial preparatory 
committees had tried to register in different civil affairs bureaux but 
some were refused and some received no response. Evidently, the 
leadership in Beiji時 was contemplating how to response to these 
applications. In early November, the CDP members, among them the 
veteran activist Xu Wen缸， declared the establishment of the “First 
CDP National Congress Preparatory Work Group". Shortly after, 
they also set out to form a “CDP Beijing-Tianjin Regional Part 
Branch", the first time a national opposition party was founded after 
1949. 
However, the repression was swift. With the departure of 
Clinton and Mary Robinson, the favorable extemal factors were 
gone. Most of the chief organizers were arrested. In July and 
October 1999, there were more detentions and imprisonment of the 
dissidents. Some managed to escape and some went into hiding. 
Beginning in December, almost all CDP leaders were rounded up 
and imprisoned. By the end of 1999, the CDP had ceased to exist. 
Despite its moderate demands and peaceful action, the CDP was still 
repressed. However far the reform stride may be, the official 
tolerance of opposition was extremely limited under the Jiang Zemin 
reign. However, there was a new characteristic which was the wide 
use of the internet in disseminating news and information (Teresa 
Wright 2002:919-921).4 
Similarly, the Falun Gong sect saga provides another example 
of using the internet to make liaison among the followers and 
eventually to be perceived as posing a threat to the CCP leadership. 
The most publicized event of F，αlun Gong was the encirclement of 
Zhongnanh缸， the nerve center of the CCP political establishment, by 
over 10,000 members from six provinces and municipalities on 25 
April 1999 (Open May 1999:17-19). According to the Xinhua 
reports , before the 25 April incident, the Falun Gong followers had 
organized 18 encirclements, demonstrations, and attacks on media, 
TV stations , and even encircled municipal government buildings in 
different provinces. Between 19 and 23 April 1999, Professor He 
Zouxiu, a member of Academy of Science at Tianjin, wrote an 
article arguing against the youth to practicing qigong and he also 
criticized Falun Gong as unscientific. Subsequently, Falun Gong 
members assembled about 1,600 members to protest against the 
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article before the Tianjin municipal government. Several days later, 
the followers targeted at Zhongnanhai. 
Falun Gong was a religious and quasi-religious group without 
any hierarchy and organizational structure, according to its adherents. 
But the authorities claimed otherwise and charged that it had a strict 
hierarchical order and structure and had Li Hongzhi as its head 
(James Tong 2002: 637-638). The society was founded in 1992 by Li 
Hongzhi. In the beginning, he gave qigong seminars and training 
sessions and soon gained enormous inf1uence in various provinces. 
In October 1996 he went to the USA with a tourist visa and since 
then he was able to have a green card and stayed in the US. By the 
time the Falun Gong movement was banned in July 1999, the 
regime claimed that it had 39 main stations, 1,900 guidance stations, 
詣，263 practice sites across the country and 2.1 million practitioners 
inside China (Brightness Daily 15 August 1999). Some estimates 
were even larger. According to a Guangdong source Nanfang Ribao 
(Southern Daily 27 July 1999), it had a following of 130 million. 
The sect has traditional Buddhist and Daoist elements. 
Essentially, it is not different from traditional religions (Kang 
Xiaoguang 2000: 160-164). The reasons that in a span of several 
years the Falun Gong could appeal to millions of followers inside 
China as well as overseas must be sought in the context of the 
marketization reform since the late 1970s. All religions are sets of 
belief systems. The collapse of Marxist-Leninist ideologies and the 
cult of Mao after the reforms have had a profound impact on the 
psychology of ordinary citizens. The revival of traditional religions 
in the reform era ‘ was a substitute for the ideological void in a 
rapidly changing Party/state context. The spread of Christianity and 
Catholicism was heavily constrained by the CCP leadership and was 
forced to go underground in developing followers. Falun Gong 
emerged and spread its influence by disguising itself as one of the 
health-strengthening traditional qigong practicing groups. According 
to Kang Xioaguang, a member of the Academy of Sciences, four 
factors contributed to the appeal of the F，αlun Gong (2000: 169: 178). 
First, the rise of Falun Gong was a spiritual response to the crisis in 
faith on the part of population in the context of valuational confusion 
created by the demise of communist ideology and Mao 's cult. 
Second, as a millennial movement, t 
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was important in the doctrine. The market reforms had created an 
extremely poverty gap and the concentration of political power 
enabled the CCP Party/state to exercise unrelenting coercion to stifle 
general discontent. Falun Gong at least, in the pursuit of justice in 
the futu間， satisfied the partial psychological and spiritual needs of 
the population. Third, as a health-strengthening organization, the 
sect's qigong and various training exercises were body strengthening 
moves. Moreover, the market reform in the public sector in general 
and the hospital sector in particular had made medial costs very 
expensive. Without a credible social insurance system, it is 
imperative to keep one's body healthy. The sect fulfilled the 
psychological need for security. Fourth, as a social organization, 
mankind is constantly in search of group identity. In the actual 
organizations or work units , one is confronted with interest pursuits 
and power intriguing struggles and only in this spiritual organization, 
one 's equality was totally achieved and one need not worry about the 
greed, thirst for power, corruption and hypocrisy. 
However, similar to the Christian church and the Catholic 
church, what the CCP feared most was not the religious beliefs but 
rather the organizational power that Falun Gong manifested during 
the 25 April 1999 incident. Most alarmingly, other religious groups 
were in its control, yet before the incident the CCP knew nothing 
about the group (Open June 1999: 11-13 ). As Kang Xiaoguang 
rightly pointed out (2000:2),"The conflicts between the CCP and 
Falun Gong were not in the belief or whether it was an evil cult or 
not, but in the organization, in the number of followers. It has too 
many followers , and thus is beyond official tolerance. A deeper issue 
is the question .of who has the power to organize groups. Could 
people organize groups in pursuit of common interest? Or whether 
the power is in the hand of govemment or people?" 
Strengthening the NPC-Three Cornered Power Game? 
In the 198侃， the National People's Congress (NPC) was 
revived and transformed and its powers were greatly expanded under 
the new constitution of 1982. The institution had made substantial 
progress in the liberalization orientation. According to the official 
source, the total number of laws enacted by the NPC and the 
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Standing Committee (SC) of the NPC from 1979 to 1998 amounted 
to 332, which covered administrative, economic, criminal and civil 
areas (People s Daily 23 March 1998). The NPC deputies had 
f1ashed their muscles on the voting of state presidents, premiers and 
chairmen of the NPC, mostly by negative votes or abstention votes. 
The process of shaking off the rubber-stamp image of the NPC 
was accelerated in the early 1990s under the chairmanship and 
vice-chairmanship of Qiao Shi and Tian Jiyun, two noted reformists 
who had been appointed at the Eighth NPC held in March 1993. 
First of all, Qiao began to recruit foreign legal experts to reorganize 
the NPC's Legislative Commission which drafted the country's 
economics legislation and laws, as the economic reform" went into 
full swing after Deng's southem trip. Second, Qiao followed the late 
NPC chairman Peng Zhen's policies of legal reform in the 1980s, 
making full use of the its SC as the operative mechanism. In fact, the 
SCNPC gained expanded power bestowed by the new constitution in 
1982. The NPC has developed several other functions besides 
law-making. The function of supervising judicial and administrative 
apparatus was strengthened and it has also established administrative 
penalties for misconduct on the part of officials in administrative and 
judicial organizations. It has exercised the investigation power in 
law enforcement more often. From 1994 to 1996, the SCNPC had 
organized forty-six inspection groups for the purpose of monitoring 
the enforcement of the laws at the sub-national levels and reports 
were sent to the SCNPC after inspection. The SCNPC would discuss 
these reports and referred to relevant authorities for the solution 
(Wang J. 1999:91). The legislators were pushing for a Law . of 
Supervision that would enable the deputies to call from State 
Council senior officials and judicial units to explain their policies or 
to impeach them if they failed to justify their policies by 1997 or 
1998. It was resisted by the officials (Ming Pao 20 November 1996). 
Since the late 1980s, the NPC had tried to assert its role 
independent of the Party and government. The 1995 statute of the 
dec1aration of the Martial Law was an example. Knowing the 
coerciveness of the martial law troops during June 1989, the law 
tried to restrain the troops by introducing stipulations such as that 
“Martial law personnel should as far as possible avoid using 
weapons." In the Third Plenary S 
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April 1995, the NPC demonstrated its institutional assertiveness in 
three occasions. Firstly, Wu Bangguo and Jiang Chunyun, two close 
followers of Jiang Zemin, nominated to be vice-premiers, were 
elected with more than one-third of negative votes from the deputies, 
to the astonishment of the Politburo. Secondly, the Education and 
Banking laws were rejected by one-fourth ofthe delegates. Third, in 
the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighth Congress held in March 
1996, over a quarter of the delegates refused to grant approval to the 
work reports of both the Supreme People's Court and Supreme 
People's Procuratorate. Furthermore, the amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Code were another piece of evidence on the 
NPC's assertion of independent power. The amendments were 
drafted by the SCNPC and passed in the 1996 Plenary Session. The 
amendments greatly liberalized criminal procedures in the PRC. 
However, it was met with strong opposition from the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
because the amendments included some lenient provisions such as 
the abolition of administrative detention. In China, it is stiU a widely 
practiced procedure that allowed the security organs to incarcerate 
suspected persons indefinitely without trial or gaining access to a 
lawyer. 
There were other acts of rebellion by the NPC and sub-national 
people's congresses. In January 1993 , the provincial people's 
congress of Zhejia時 was supposed to elect a new governor. The 
Party committee, through the presidium, nominated the incumbent 
governor Ge Hongsheng, a new rising star, who had been recently 
elected as one of the Central Committee (CC) members. The 
deputies ignored the signals from the above and nominated two more 
candidates for competition. One withdrew and the other contestant 
Wan Xueyuan, one of vice governors, was elected. In the 
competitive elections for the vice governors, six of the nine 
candidates nominated by the deputies were elected (Cheng Ming 
April 1994夕-11). In May 1989, the Hunan provincial people's 
congress moved to impeach the vice govemor Yang Huiquan whose 
inability and corruption angered the deputies. The deputies were 
successful in dismissing him (Ming Xia 2000: 168). In Minqing 
county of Fujian province in March 1994, the county people's 
congress vetoed a government decision about the price of tap water. 
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However, the govemment did not accept this and proceeded with the 
decision. The congress openly condemned the move and forced it to 
cancel the decision (An Chen 1999: 201). The provincial people's 
congress of Guangdong declined to confirm the appointment of the 
two department heads in February 2000. Shenyang municipal 
people's congress of Liaoning did not pass the work report of the 
municipal court in February 200 l. The municipal people's congress 
of Hechi of Guangxi province rejected the government work report 
on the management of the intemet bars. In January 2003 , the 
municipal people 's congress of Yueyang of Hunan province failed to 
elect the mayor nominated by Party committee in the first round and 
he was finally elected in the second round but the election process 
was strongly condemned by the deputies (Apple 5 January 2003). In 
May 2003 , in Shenzhen Futian district, a Party-nominated candidate 
was defeated in the election of the deputies and Wang Lian巴， a US 
educated master-degree holder, won the election as an independent 
(Apple 22 May 2003) . 
As the marketization of the economy proceeds and China's 
merging with the world capitalist economy accelerates after the 
accession to the WTO, the NPC and the sub-national people 's 
congresses have been gaining enormous powers and authority, which 
were manifested in the following aspects. First, legislative 
effectiveness: notwithstanding the national legislature which has 
made more 300 laws since the late 1970s, more than 5,300 local 
laws were passed by the sub-national people 's congresses. Second, 
economic decision-making: As China's economy becomes more 
intemationalized and the burden to legislate lies in the NPC. In fact, 
most of the legislation was concemed about economics. Third, 
expanding power in the periphery: The NPC had given generous 
support to the legislative processes in the sub-national level, such as 
the support given to the Hunan provincial people 's congress in 
ousting the vice governor. Fourth, judicial review: the power to 
interpret the laws and determine the constitutionality of local laws 
and administrative decrees lies in the NPC. Fifth, informational 
power: the NPC has become a cohesive institution in the whole 
political system. Sixth, veto power, the NPC and sub-national 
people's congresses certainly have the veto power vis-as-vis the 
personnel appointment. The potential restraint imposed by this 
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power served to remind the CCP of its limitations (Ming Xia 2000: 
127-128). 
However its secondary role in the Chinese polity has remained 
unchanged. During the 4 June crisis, despite the calling of an urgent 
meeting and potential impeachment of Li Peng by more than fi街
SC members of the NPC, they were not able to convene a plenary 
meeting to investigate the Tiananmen chaos. The incidents show 
the feebleness ofthe NPC. The CCP leadership believed that the role 
of the NPC in the 1990s should not be changed. A few days a丘er
the crackdown, Deng addressed the officers of troops of the curfew, 
stating the inviolability of the existing political structure. He said “1n 
the reform of the political structure, 'one thing is certain: we must 
adhere to the system of the people's congress instead of practicing 
the separation of the judicial, executive and legislative powers upon 
the American pa位ern. As a matter of fact, not all the Western 
countries follow the pattern of separation of powers" (Deng 
1994:299). 
Despite the negative votes, the refusal to pass the 
Party-nominated candidates for official positions, and other 
supervisory mechanisms exercised by the NPC or local people's 
congresses in the 1990s, there have been control mechanisms by the 
CCP over the legislative bodies that would make the collective 
rebellion of the members almost impossible. First, most if not all the 
NPC deputies were CCP members. Approximately, two-third of the 
deputies from 1988 to 1998 were CCP members. 1n particular for the 
SC members of the NPC, it was estimated that since 1983 the 
percentage of CCP members in SCNPC was not below 75 (An Chen 
1999: 163). With the dominant inf1uence by the Party members in 
the NPC and SCNPC, it was guaranteed that the legislative intent 
would not deviate from the Party line. Second，如rthermore ， there 
existed the Party committee within the SCNPC, which could 
command the loyalty of the Party members. The Party committee 
could at the same time serve as a bridge between the Party and state. 
Despite the lack of detailed analyses of the intemal channels of 
communications within the Party/state, it is widely known that every 
piece of important legislation must be examined and approved by the 
CCP Politburo. 1n a move to control the provincial people's 
congresses , starting with the 14th CCP congress , the Party's first 
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secretary should at the same time hold the chairmanship of SC of the 
people's congresses and during the 1990s, this practice was widely 
adopted. 
After two decades of reform and the strengthening of the NPC, 
has the political system become a three- cornered power game or are 
the three corners of equal angles (An Chen 1999: 166-171)? Or has 
the system become a ‘semi-anticipatory democracy' (Ming Xia 2000 
128)? The answer is far from definite. ln spite of greater tolerance 
towards intra-party/state dissent, it is clear that the CCP has always 
remained the power arbitrator. 
Administrative Reform 
Comparing with the strengthening of the NPC, which serves as 
a relatively minor check and balance on the State Council, the 
administrative reform or streamlining of the bureaucracy was the 
most important reform measure in the 1990s from the top leadership. 
Similar to the 1980s, there were two waves of administrative reform 
in the 1990s. The first one started in 1993 and the second one in 
1998. The background to the administrative reform or organizational 
restructuring was, on the one hand, China's inexorable march 
towards a marketized economy and, on the other hand, the 
re-emergence of bureaucratism in the early 1990s. At the 
Fourteenth CCP Congress held in October 1992, the leadership 
called for the establishment of a socialist market economy. ln 1993, 
the CCP even desired to achieve a socialist market system before the 
end .of the twentieth century. Jiang Zemin's Political Report (1 992) 
stated the importance of administrative reform in the process of 
rapid modernization. He stated that “ If we are to reform the political 
structure, deepen the economic reform, establish a market economy 
and accelerate the modernization drive, we must make it our urgent 
task to streamline the organizational structure and to simplify 
administrative layers." He condemned the phenomena of 
bureaucratism, such as “bloated bureaucracy, over-staffing, merging 
of government and enterprises which directly hinder the deepening 
economic reform and influence the relationships between the Party 
and people." 
The budget of the Party/government personnel had almost 
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become unbearable. In 1979, the number of Party/state cadres was 
2.79 million. Ten years later, it had shot up almost double to 5.43 
million and in 1998, there were 30 million cadres. In twenty years , 
the number of government personnel increased more than ten times. 
The population increase certainly was less than ten times in twenty 
years (Liu Zhifeng 1998: 63). In the first halfof 199郎， the changes 
of the government function , which means the separation of the 
govemment and enterprises became the focal point of the political 
structural reform, along with the administration in the state 
machinery (Chan and Drewry 2001). The separation of government 
from the enterprises was seen as the beginning of the switch of 
government function. In addition, the ultimate goal of the 
administrative reform was to establish a socialist market economy, 
which would pave the way for the accession to the WTO. After the 
Sixteenth CCP Congress , the reform focus shifted to instituting 
so-called grass-root democracy in the countryside or villages. In 
engineering the 1993 State Council reform, Li Peng basically 
summarized the administrative reform in the 1980s as a failure . He 
criticized the bureaucracy's failure to meet the challenges of 
modemization or economic development. The problems nowadays 
in the state apparatuses were “merging of the state and enterprises , 
the relationships not well defined, bloated staffing and low 
efficiency" (1993). 
In the. early 1990s, the organizational units including ministries , 
commissions, affiliated and working organizations had increased 
from 80 in 1988 to 86 in 1993. The total number of Party/state 
cadres at the end of 1991 was 9.2 million and fiscal expenditure was 
140 billion yuan, accounting 370/0 of the GDP. The reform proposal 
attempted to reduce the total number of staff from 36,700 to 29,200 
in the central administration, a 20% reduction, cutting 86 working 
units to 59 (Liu Zhifeng 1998:306-307). The refonn concentrated on 
changing the pattern of the economic ministries. The sectoral reform 
or streamlining took place in three ways. First, some government 
ministries were changed to jingji shiti (economic entities) with no 
administrative functions. The administration and running of these 
entities were left to market forces , such as the abolition of the 
Ministry of Aeronautical Industry and setting up of the Aeronautical 
lndustrial Company, etc. Second, some departrnents bec 
21 
hangye zonghui (professional associations), which would be 
subordinated directly to the State Council, and they were established 
to replace some ministries such as the Ministries of Light lndustries 
and Textile. The goal of these professional associations was to 
co-ordinate policies and exercise macro-supervision over the 
professions and facilitate services for the professionals. Finally, the 
carryover or newly-created administrative ministries featured were 
given streamlined administrative structures, which would engage in 
planning, coordination, servicing and supervision of the industries 
concemed. The retained Ministries included Railway, Transport, 
Forestry, and Agriculture, etc. The newly set up Ministries included 
Ministries of Mechanical lndustry, Electronic lndustry, etc. To 
improve the efficiency of the State Council, reshu旺ling also took 
place within the State Council's affiliated organizations and it took 
three forms , first, retaining the important working units, such as 
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office; second, merging with the 
original ministries and becoming a sub-unit or ju (bureau), such as 
National Earthquake Bureau and National Property Management 
Bureau; third, merging with the Ministries and becoming a zhineng 
ju 如nctional bureau) such as the National Herbal Medicine 
Management Bureau. With these measures, the number of affiliated 
and working units was reduced from 44 to 18 (GOSC 1995:8-10).5 
Luo Gan, then secretary-general of the State Council, decreed 
that the government departments had to change functions , simplify 
administrative structure and decentralize decision-making power, in 
line with marketization reform. The government bureaucracy must 
be simplified and the enterprises have to enhan,ce the competitive 
edge by entering the market. ln the reform process, twenty-seven 
ministries and departments were eliminated, including seven 
specialized economic departments. The number of cadres was 
reduced by 20 percent, from 36,700 to 29,200 (GOSC 1995: 10) 
The 1990s was a rapidly developing era for China. EconOlnic 
growth was in double-digit figures and incorporation into the world 
capitalist economy quickened process. The negotiations with the 
USA over the accession to the WTO had been going on since the 
mid-1980s. However, by mid-1990s, the administrative reform 
seemed to be failing in the midst of the marketization of the 
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“Although achievement had been made in the previous reform 
a社empts ， because of the 0 伊ctive constraints, a lot of problems 
remained unresolved. The contradictions between the organizational 
apparatus and socialist development had become increasingly 
app訂e剖， such as over-staff bureaucracy, inseparation of the 
govemment and enterprises, the growth of bureaucratism and 
corruption and fiscal burden." In 1998, China had 33 million 
Party/state cadres whose salaries were paid by the state. Among 
them 25 million personnel belonged to various kinds of public 
institutions and 8 million were cadres at all levels of the 
administration (Chan and Drewry 2001 :557). The financial budget of 
these sta在 accounted for almost 400/0 of the total budget of the state 
(Liu Zhife時 1998:24-25)
The 1998 administrative reform was the most drastic and 
comprehensive organizational streamlining in the history ofthe PRC. 
40 ministries and commissions in the State Council were slashed to 
29, a reduction of 27010. More than 200 bureaus , about 25% of the 
total, were also abolished. Furthermore, the reform aimed to reduce 
the State Council employees to 16,700, a reduction of 47.5% (GOSC 
1998:39). In 1997, Jiang Zemin had already laid bare the rationale 
and principles of this administrative reform. In his Report to the 
Sixth Plenum of the 15th CCP Congress, he said, 
In accordance with the requirement of a socialist market 
economy we need to alter the functions of the government 
and sep缸ate them from those of enterprises so that 
enterprises will be truly given the power with regard to 
production, operation and management. Follo"Ying the 
principle of simplification, uniformity and efficiency in 
reform, we shall establish a highly efficient, 
well-coordinated and standard administrative system, with a 
view to improving its service to the people. The departments 
in charge of comprehensive economic management should 
shift their functions to macroeconomic control, and 
specialized economic departments should be reorganized or 
reduced. We shall improve the works of departments 
supervising law enforcement and cultivate and expand social 
intermediary organizations. We shall deepen the reform of 
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the administrative system, statutorily delimiting the 
structures, functions sizes and working procedures of the 
state organs and ensuring that their sizes are kept within 
authorized limits and their redundant personnel are reduced. 
There are three measures suggested in the Repo此， namely changing 
some ministries into enterprises or corporations set up under the 
State Council, streamlining or the outright abolition of some 
govemment ministries or commissions, and the downsizing of staff. 
The direction of the reform was similar to the 1993 reform and the 
overall goal of the reform was to create a ‘small government, big 
society' environment which could facilitate economic reform. After 
the ninth NPC in March 1998, the administrative reforrn began to 
take full force. First，的 out of 40 ministries and commissions of the 
State Council were eliminated, such as the Ministries of Electrical 
Industries, Mechanical lndustries, lnternal Trade and Labor, etc. 
Second, half of the 32,000 personnel within the State Council would 
be transferred or discharged. The guiding principle in the reform 
regarding personnel was that no one was to be unemployed. The 
personnel had to be either re-deployed or retrained. In three years , 
one million central and local govemment cadres positions were cut. 
Third, in the planned economy era, the ministries and commission 
were designed to micro-manage the economy and state enterprises. 
Some economic management units were downgraded from 
commission and ministry status to departmental status. Their powers 
and functions were limited to three major tasks: macro management, 
guidance in structuring industry and facilitation of fair competition 
among business sectors. The direct management of enterprises was 
prohibited. The State Planning Commission would be redesigned as 
the State Development Planning Commission. The State Planning 
Commission had been directing the economy since the 1950s but the 
new renamed Commission would take charge of macro management 
of regulation, long term development planning and the maintenance 
of general economic equilibrium. Market forces would be the chief 
determinant of the economy. In addition, the Organization Laws of 
the State Council would be revised to provide more flexibility in 
regulation. Fourth, four ministries and commissions were newly 
created to meet the challenges imposed by the advent of 
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globalization such as Ministries of Information Industry, Labor and 
Social Security, etc. There were 22 carry-over ministries and 
cOlnmissions. At the locallevel, the Organization Laws of Localities 
would give more autonomy to the local governments in 
implementing central gove口lll1ent policies. Finally, local 
governments would have to follow the reform measures but local 
variations would be allowed and also the extent of marketization in 
the Western regions was different from the coastal developed areas. 
Chinese social scientists have labeled the cycles of 
streamlining-swe l1 ing-re-streamlining re-swelIing as ‘historic 
vicious cycles' (Liu Zhifeng 1998 :317). All previous a位empts at 
re-organization had failed. Hsia Jingkl泣， a political scientist 剖
Beij ing University analyzed the ‘vicious circles' or lack of success in 
organizational reform as being due to five factors. First, the CCP as a 
ruling party had designated Marxism and Leninism's democratic 
centralism as theoretical guiding line for the Party as well as whole 
country. Centralization was the key feature of the system. Second, 
the systemic features of the former Soviet Union had a shaping 
influence on the formation of the existing PRC 
socio-political-economic system. The influence was difficult to erase. 
Third, under the reign of Mao, efficiency was not an important factor 
worth mentioning. The PRC always emphasized the importance of 
quantity rather quality. Therefore, streamlining was not considered 
necessary in eradicating bureaucratism. Fourth, perhaps influenced 
by traditional dynastic conventions, the Party/state cadres had the 
psychological factor that they could not be demoted or downgraded. 
This allowed for the expansion of bureaucracy. Fifth, the Perhaps the 
most important factor was institutional. For a long time, there has 
not been any institutional check or curbing on the centralization of 
power ofthe CCP (Liu Zhifeng 1998: 323-324). Despite the fact that 
the marketization reform was in full force in China, it is difficult to 
believe that the organizational reform measures would succeed given 
the past experiences-6 
Instituting Grass-roots Democracy 
Besides the organizational streamlining which focused on the 
separation of the government and enterprises and efficiency 
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enhancement within the bureaucracy, the CCP leadership seemed to 
play up the grass-roots or self rule elections since the mid-1990s. 
Grass-roots elections or democracy was another big piece of 
political structural reform in the second half 1990s. After 1949, there 
were three stages of development in the organization of grass-roots 
structure in the rural areas. First, from 1949 to 1957, was a stage in 
which the xiang (town) administrative structure co-existed with 
agricultural co-operatives. Second, from 1958 to 1982, People's 
Communes were established and then dissolved. Large and small 
production teams also existed. Finally, after 1982, the new state 
constitution was passed and decreed the establishment of village 
committees in the rural areas. There were three phases in the 
development of the village self rule. First, from 1982 to 1987, this 
phase began with the 1982 state constitution which requires the 
establishment of the resident committees and village committees in 
the rural and urban areas as mass self rule organizations. Second, 
from 1987 to 1990, the Provisional Organic Law 01 the Village 
Committee 01 the People s Republic 01 China was promulgated by 
the 13 th Standing Meeting ofthe Sixth NPC in 1987, stating that the 
law came to effect on 1 June 1988. Third, after 1990, the self rule 
governance was accepted by the top CCP leadership and extended to 
the whole country (Bai Yihu丸 Yang Kaiwang and Chih-yu Shih 
1998: 255-257). The origin of the village committees emerged in 
two Guangxi counties (Yishan and Luocheng) in late 1980. The first 
Villagers Representative Assembly was set up in nanlou village 
(Hebei). The village committees were formed by local villagers and 
cadres to manage village affairs in the midst of the breakup of the 
People's Commune and production teams. They reported to the 
higher authorities and finally Beij ing accepted and legitimized the 
formal structure in the 1982 state constitution (O'Brien and 
Lianjiang Li 2000:465). 
Officially, the 930,000 villages across the country were 
required to hold elections on village heads and committee members 
after 1988. Between 1988 and 1990, about 1,093 villages were 
selected by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) to be trial cases. The 
MAC set up special training workshops to recruit cadres to conduct 
the village committee elections. In the early 199仇， the MAC 
selected the “demonstration villages" by applying the official 
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guidelines which were adopted and made public in April 1994. The 
guidelines decreed that direct and competitive elections must be held 
at the village level. Second, the “village representative assemblies" 
should be established and oversee the elected village committees. 
Lastly, village charters and codes of conduct for cadres and villagers 
by the representative village assemblies were issued. 
Direct democracy at the village level was backed up by the 
CCP leadership as a whole. Li Peng said that “1n our country 
democracy starts with the grass-roots, because for an ordinary 
villager the person who is of direct concern is not the governor or 
the county magistrate... .but the chairman of the village 
committee."(SCMP 1 December 199兇8). Zh仙lU Ron沌蚓1屯羽皂剖ji (1 999蚓仍) 
emphasized t血ha剖t
that reflect the public opinion so that public opinion could be 
absorbed into the governmen削1's decision making process. We must 
further strengthen the system of democratic decisions and cautiously 
and consistent1y develop the function of the village committees." 1n 
the Fifteenth CCP Congress in 1997, Jiang Zemin (1 997) pointed out 
that “To extend grass-root democracy, guarantee the direct exercise 
of democratic rights , manage their own affairs and create a happy 
life, are the widest practice of socialist democracy." Evident1y, from 
the 0缸icial perspective, village elections both have the form and 
substance of democracy. According to the official documents , they 
fulfilled five purposes. First, the villagers have the power to manage 
their own affairs and are the masters of their future. Second, the 
elections show that the villagers have the ability to exercise 
democratic rights. Third, the elections improve the relationships 
between the villagers and Party/state cadres and eased tensions on 
both sides. Fourth, the elections improve the relationships and 
communications between the Party as a whole and the peasantry. 
Fifth, the elections generate incentives for the peasantry in managing 
their own affairs (Bai Yihua, Yang Kaiwang and Chih-yu Shih 
1998:260-261). 
Since the concept of self rule for the mass organization was first 
conceived in the 1980s and elections of the village committee heads 
started in 1988, why did the CCP leadership blow up the issue into 
one of the major pieces of political structural reform in the 
mid-1990s? During Clinton 's 1998 visit to China, he was invited to 
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discuss village elections with the peasants in Xia He village near 
Xian (Ming Pao 27 June 1998). There were four reasons. Firstly, the 
most thorny issues in the Sino-US relationship were first the Taiwan 
problem and second the human rights issue. In the aftermath of the 4 
June crackdown, human rights became the issue that the US 
government must handle with China. China's human rights record 
was so poor that it was practically defenseless in the face of the US 
accusations. Every ye訂 since the ear1y 1990s the issue of human 
rights would heat up as the Congress renewed the Most Favored 
Nation trade status of the PRC. China began to use two tactics to 
counter attack. First, publishing a human rights report on the USA 
and charging the USA with adopting double standards or selective 
standards in assessing the human rights record of other countries. 
Second, trying to play up the self rule village committees elections 
and claiming that China, in fact, has more basic democratic rights 
for the people than the USA. Secondly, the village elections could 
serve as delaying tactics by the hard-liners to the reformists within 
the Party who was asking more radical reform pace. Thirdly, since 
the reform started in the late 1970s, the Party's totalistic power over 
society in general and in rural areas in particul缸， had shrunken 
considerably. The stability in the rural areas indeed worried the 
leadership. By allowing the elections to take place, at least the 
elected heads would have legitimacy and would perform as best as 
they could to win the next elections and thereby stabilize the 
situation in the rural areas. According to an internal document, the 
Party structure has collapsed in up to 30% of China's village. 7 
Fourthly, the village committees are mass organizations of self rule 
and they are not even part of the formal executive structure of the 
political system. They are extremely remote from the power core in 
Beijing and therefore certainly would not threaten the power base of 
the CCP. 
Are the village elections truly democratic? In an empirical 
study, Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan (2000) have observed 
many such elections and discussed with many Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MCA) officials. They have come to the following 
conclusion. First, there was not a complete set of data on the entire 
country. In response to the question posed to the MCA officials 
about how many village elections were conducted according to the 
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election laws, the officials answered “Perhaps 50%, frankly we do 
not know." Party village secretaries usually served on the village 
election committee that supervised village elections and therefore 
could wield enormous influence in election outcomes. According to 
their estimate, probably less than half of the village heads ran 
competitively. There has been widespread use of proxy votes and 
secret balloting was not always used. There were also different 
voting procedures even though the MCA had been trying hard to 
standardize them. One thing the authors were sure was that "There is 
no evidence that national leaders are trying to control villages. This 
may be because the Communist P訂ty is not threatened by village 
elections.. ..The Party's interest in free elections, however, might not 
be so impartial if the elections move up the ladder of the 
government" (Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan 2000:508-509). 
1n another study identifying the locus of decision- making 
power in the Chinese village, Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle (2000) 
suggested that the broadly inclusive village assemblies and partially 
-elected village committees meet only infrequent1y. Moreover, there 
appeared to be wide variations in the actual power for the smaller 
village committees (5 to 7 persons). For some, the elected committee 
is the seat of power decision, for some the Party secretary decides 
every thing. The variations seems to tie in with the nature of village 
economy and the changing bases of power in China's countryside 
after the de-collectivization in the early 1980s. However, they found 
out that the percentage of Party members in the village committees 
(640/0 and 650/0 in two cases) were more than the MCA officials 
claimed (25 to 35% generally) (2000:521). 
According to a Chinese social scientist, unlawful activities were 
widespread and they could be manifested in the following five ways 
(Bai Gan 2001)8. First, bribery to gain the necessary votes to be 
elected. One vote normally costs from 20 yuan to 30 yuan. However, 
a Party secretary of a village in Yangjiang City, Guangdong Province 
spent totally 300,000 yuan for votes and also manipulated the ballot 
to be elected as the director of the village committee. Second, 
appointed or assigned elections, this means that instead of allowing 
the villagers to vote, the township government directly appointed or 
assigned the director or committee members. Third, the election 
organizati 
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competitive elections to be held; not providing secret ballots; not 
selecting formal candidates in the villager representative meeting; 
sometimes electing the director or members of the village 
committees by the village representatives only, etc. Fourth, illegal 
procedures, for sometimes the electoral committees were selected by 
the township government; sometimes votes by proxy were not 
strict1y carried out by relevant laws; ballots were not counted; 
sometimes voter participation failed to be reported, etc. Fifth, there 
were various ways to sabotage the elections by unlawful means. 
Sometimes the old members refused to transfer power to the 
newly-elected members and sometimes the town government 
dismissed the elected director or members without going through a 
village meeting (Bai Gang 2001: 17-21).9 
The revised Organic Law of the Village Committees was passed 
by the 5th SC of the NPC in November 1998. With that, the village 
elections or self government shed their trial status and elections 
procedures have been standardized. According to the Law, the 
elections must be competitive and the voting must be secret (article 
14), and “the members of the village committees are to be elected 
directly by villager; they may not be designated, appointed or 
replaced by any organization or individual" (Article 11), etc. 
However, in a move to guarantee the dominance of the Party, the 
new Law stipulates that the Party branch is the village's “leadership 
core “ (lindao hexin) (article 3). Therefore, ultimately,“Elections are 
designed to increase mass support for the Party, and grass-root 
democracy is understood to be fully compatible with strong state 
control" (O'Brien and Lianjiang Li 2000:488-489) 
Jiang Zemin at one time called for the expan~ion of direct 
elections from the village to the township leve1. The population of a 
township constituted about 100,000 people. According to Jiang, the 
local elected organs of power and self-goveming mass organizations 
in both urban and rural areas shall establish a sound system of 
democratic elections. 1ndeed, there was breakthrough in the electoral 
system in the 1990s. 1n November 1998, a small township called 
Buyun in Sichuan province held a direct election for the township 
magistrate (Ming Pao 11 , 12, 13 , February 1999). The election was 
competitive. 1n the end the Party representative won by a majority of 
12 votes and the election was declared valid by th 
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big step forward in the personnel reform. According to the PRC 
constitution, the township level has direct elections in the deputies to 
the local people's congresses. The election was a breakthrough 
because people were electing an executive head not the legislators to 
the local people's congress. 
Unlike the Buyun election in Sichuan which gained widespread 
publicity, there was another form of election of the township 
govemment head in the late 1990s, which received much less 
attention. Arguably the question of constitutionality regarding the 
Buyun election was debatable but the election in Dapeng town, 
Longgang District, Shenzhen was perfectly constitutional when the 
CCP launched the so-called “two ticket" election in electing a 
township head. The electorate could forward their candidates and 
five were confirmed as candidates and they were voted (first round) 
on by the electorate of the whole town. The one with the highest 
votes was recommended to be the only candidate to be voted in the 
second round of election by deputies of the local people's congress 
which was in congruence with the state constitution (Wang Weiping 
2000: 17-22). However, the Biyun and Dapeng experiences seemed 
to have confined to Sichuan Province and Shenzhen. 1n November 
2001 , a circular issued by the central authorities demanded that the 
upcoming elections in township and village be conducted strictly 
according to law which had the effect of banning direct elections at 
the township levels (SCMP 22 November 2001). Since the Sixteenth 
CCP Congress in November 2002, the CCP top leadership has 
decided that to develop intra-party democracy is more appropriate 
than developing grass-root democracy (Ming Pao 10 October 2003; 
Ta Kung Pao 11 October 2003). 
Fighting Against Corruption as a Reform Strategy 
Corruption could be defined as the use of public power in 
pursuit of private benefits (Wang Hunin 1990: 145; Hu Angang 2001: 
2-4). 1n the Chinese context, the immoral conduct is manifested in 
many aspects: lnisappropriation of public or government fun血，
recelvmg or offering bribes , involvement in smuggling activities, 
collecting taxes illegally, recelvmg kickbacks and exchanging 
benefits, etc. It must be admitted that in the 1950s and 1960s, there 
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were relatively fewer corruption cases in the PRC. The most serious 
case was the case in 1952 of the district Party secretary of Tianjian 
called Liu Jiansan who was involved to an amount of one hundred 
seventeen thousand yuan. At the same time there were repeated 
political campaigns such as Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns to 
stamp out co叮upt elements of bourgeois or anti-revolutionaries. 
Anti-corruption then was taken as a form of c1ass struggle. The mass 
purges in the political campaigns prevented people committing 
corruption because people were afraid of being perceived as c1ass 
enemies by the new regime (Wang Hunin 1990:33-45). The political 
and ideological campaigns eliminated the chances of corruption. 
The situation changed completely after the reform and open 
door policies were launched in the late 1970s. The focus of the 
Party's work had shifted from ideological struggles to economic 
construction and mass political campaigns basically stopped. 
Huntington (1968: 59-6月 argued that in the modernization process, 
corruption tends to increase tremendously because of three reasons: 
Firstly, the drastic social changes cause traditional values to change. 
Behavior that was accepted by traditional norms would not tolerable 
by modernized values, such as equality, freedom, openness and 
transparency, etc. Secondly, the process of modemization has created 
new venues of prosperity and wealth. New social groups of wealth 
were also created and this might cause the traditional power elite to 
exchange political power for tìnancial benefits and social groups 
want to gain political access to the ruling elite through wealth. 
Thirdly, the process of modernization produces a demand to enhance 
the control of governance on the part of the central government and 
this creates the chances of corruption in the centralization process. 
Evidently, the CCP leadership was aware of the seriousness of 
the rampant corruption and its impact on the legitimacy of the CCP. 
In November 1979, Deng Xiaoping made a speech (1983: 187-202) 
against special privileges be given to senior cadres because these 
would make the senior oftìcials detached from the common people. 
In August 1981 , the Central Discipline Committee sent a decree to 
the provincial and local Discipline Committee, demanding strict 
discipline be applied to all Party members. In November 1983 , the 
Second Plenum of the Twel丘h CCP passed the Decision 
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General Office decreed that all phenomena of co口uption including 
fund embezzlement, briberies, and privileges of cadres be ceased. 
1mportant provisions and regulations were pronounced to guide the 
behavior of the Party members. For example, Certain Proνisions 
about the Political Life in the Pa仰 in 1980, the Decision to Fight 
the Serious Criminal Activities in the Economic Arena in April 1982, 
the Provisions 01 Prohibiting the Party/state Apparatus Setting 
Enterprises and 1mνJolvνJing in Comη1mη'lerci αal Acti仰!江句圳1νvi材祕i訶衍tie臼s in February 1986, 
the 1昆全b切枷mη'lporaαr吵y Pr，昀Oν附i.臼‘sio
St的αt紹e~怎goν附-nme叫 Personnel Committing Corruption in September 
1988, etc. 
1n the 1990s, nearly every year Jiang delivered a speech to the 
Central Discipline 1nspection Committee, emphasizing the 
importance of a clean government and the style of work of the Paliy. 
He even raised the campaigns against corruption to the level of life 
and death for the CCP (Jiang 2001 :475). Since the mid-1990s, 
unlike before, instead of emphasizing the Party's examplary 
functions and the role model emulation effect or the supervisory 
functions of the Party, the top leadership has been stressing the 
importance of zhidu (institutions). Jiang (200 1:477-478) said that 
“We must rely on institutional innovation to root out corruption. This 
is one of the important lessons we have learnt from the past. Good 
institutions can prevent effectively the spread of corruption and, on 
the contrary, bad institutions can spread corruption." Therefore, 
graft-fighting units were set up across the country. By mid-1996 , 
more than 1700 Anti-corruption Bureaus had been erected in 29 
provincial, 289 district and municipal levels and 1,400 grassroots 
Procuratorate. Mechanisms of public participation in fighting 
corruption were also established. There were 2929 centers or 
hotlines where citizens could file reports and complaints (Ming Pao 
October 9 1995) 
Despite all these rhetoric and measures , corruption was 
sprouting across the country. There was a tremendous increase from 
the 1980s. The number of corruption cases can be seen from the 
following tables for the 1980s: 
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Table 1 
Number andA f Corruotion and Briberv Cases in the 198 
Amount 
Over 10 thousand 
Over 100 thousand 
Over 200 thousand 
Over 500 thousand 
Source: Wang Hunin 1990: 66-68 
In the 1980s, corruption and bribery cases involving an amount 
of more than 500 thousand yuan were relatively few. ll In 1980, 
when the minister of trade Wang Lei refused to pay in a Beijing 
restaurant and caused a public outcry, he was publicly criticized by 
the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC). This was the 
first senior official at the provincial level who was exposed and 
condemned. However, the first senior provincial level official who 
was charged with a criminal offence and subsequently imprisoned 
did not occur until 1987. By the late 1990s, the number of 
middle-ranking and senior officials who comrnitted corruption had 
shot up sharply. In 1999, according to the annual report of the CD此，
the number of 。在icials who were prosecuted was as follows: 4092 at 
county/department level, 327 at districtlbureaus level, 17 at 
provincial/ministerial leve l. In 2000, 4146 county/department level, 
331 前 districtlbureaus level, and 21 前 provincial/ministerial level 
(The Mirror February 2000:31). Moreover, the amount involved was 
shockingly large. For example in 1996, there were 397 cases of 
corruption that involved amounts from one million to ten million 
yuan, and 59 cases amount of more than ten million yuan (The 
Mirror November 2000:35). The highest official who was executed 
over criminal charges of corruption had accepted bribes up to 40 
million yuan in 2000. In 1999, the Party secretary of Ningpo city 
misappropriated public funds amounting to 1.2 billion 叭lan and the 
vice-mayor of Shenyang lost 36 million yuan gambling in Macau. In 
a district in Guangdong, an official who was in charge of a financial 
department appropriated public funds up to 150 million yuan (The 
Mirror April 2000:21 ).12 By the end of the century, even the CCP 
leaders admitted that five important feature characterized the 
rampant corruption: first, most cases involved a great amount of 
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money; second, senior officials were involved; third, organized/gang 
corruption occurred; fourth, officials joined criminal gangs; fifth, 
power greedy officials were making quick profit out of the post (The 
Mirror March 2000:26). 
Without doubt, corruption caused gre剖 losses to the Chinese 
government. Many customs officials in Fujian, Guangdong and 
Guangxi provinces were involved in smuggling activities and the 
financial loss for the state levies could be seen from the following 
tables. 
Table 2 
~~ . 
Year NO.ofcases Value Value of each case 
caught (1 00 million) (100 million) 
1979 0.07 0.07 0.05 
1980 0.51 0.51 0.14 
1981 1.06 1.06 0.30 
1982 1.02 1.02 0.31 
1983 0.59 0.59 0.17 
1984 1.36 1.36 0.50 
1985 7.09 7.09 3.00 
1986 6.11 6.11 3.31 
1987 1.67 1.67 1.28 
1988 2.34 2.34 2.29 
1989 5.58 5.58 4.67 
1990 6.01 6.01 5.15 
1991 7.l 3 7.13 5.35 
1992 13.18 13.18 13.24 
1993 23.00 23.00 33.96 
1994 22.88 22.88 34.59 
1995 44.30 44.30 75.96 
1996 92.89 92.89 15 1.53 
1997 67.35 67.35 92.70 
1998 83.81 154.00 183 .57 
Source: Economic Journal 26 January 1999 (Quoted from Hu 
Angang 2001 :52) 
Although the number of smuggling cases caught was relatively 
fewer in the 1990s than the 198郎， the amount uncovered was much 
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larger. This trend had been increasing since the late 1980s. In 1998, 
the amount was 15 .4 billion yu徊， a great loss to the state revenue. 
Moreover, according to Hu Angang (2001 :34), the financial loss 
caused by di在erent types of corruption amounted to 13.20/0 to 16.8% 
of China's GDP by the second half of the 1990s. As he said, 
“Corruption has become the greatest social pollution in China" 
(2001:62). Furthennore, according to Vito Ta凹， an IMF analyst, 
corruption would bring consequences other than just financialloss to 
the govemment. First, corruption would paralyze the governmental 
ability to exercise effective supervision over public sectors. Second, 
corruption would distort the incentive mechanisms as people would 
indulge in non-productive activities. Third, corruption would add to 
the extra cost of production and services. Fourth, corruption would 
distort the government ability to enforce agreements and property 
protection. Fifth, corruption would decrease the legitimacy of the 
market economy and sometimes even democratic politics. Sixth, 
corruption would deprive the poor of the opportunities of earning 
potentialities. 13 Hu Angang explicitly pointed out (2001: 22) that 
“The main source of corruption comes from the Party/state in which 
extremely complicated and possessing various degrees of influences 
of interest groups have been formed. A significant part of these 
groups have evolved into what the former Soviet Union bureaucratic 
privileged strata. They try to maximize their interest and at the same 
time they become the greatest obstacle to reform anti-corruption 
drive. This is an essential feature of social change since the reform 
and open policies were launched." The root of the rampant 
corruption lies in the uncqecked power of the CCP. The CCP has 
more than sixty million members and the Party members hold 
thousands of position ranging from village head to the state president. 
Moreover, the Party holds that the Party should dominate in every 
field. In the reform era, despite the shrinking power in the Party/state 
over society, the tremendous national resources are at the hands of 
the Party apparachik. Mass media have been under strict control 
from the Central Propaganda Department. In the name of political 
stability, many serious cases of corruption were forbidden to be 
reported. 14 The problem is that basically nobody watches the 
watchdog. 
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Conclusion 
Since the reform started in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
CCP Congress , Deng Xiaoping was the key figure in the whole 
reform era until he died in 1997. He claimed himself to be the core 
of the second generation of the CCP leadership since 1949. His 
anointed successor Jiang Zemin was the core of the third generation. 
In the twenty years of the reform process under them China's 
economic structure and, to some extent, its political structure had 
changed significantly. First, the replacement of public ownership 
by mixed mode of ownership induding private ownership. Now, 
individuals can own private properties and set up private business, 
and through the shareholding system the state sectors were 
transformed into non-state sectors. Second, China's GDP growth rate 
between 1980-1990 averaged 9.5%. In politics, the Marxist orthodox 
line was abandoned and class struggles as the key link discarded. 
Then four modernization became the primary task of the CCP. In the 
past twenty years the NPC, Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference and State Council underwent different degrees of reform. 
In addition, there were elections at the village and township levels. 
However, the limitations of these reforms were evident. The nature 
ofthese reforms in Deng and Jiang's eras were different. The turning 
point was the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement in 1989. Before 
the crackdown, Deng's political structural reform was hindered by 
internal “ two front" struggles, i.e. ultra-leftist tendencies and 
bourgeois liberalization. In the 1990s, to enhance the legitimacy of 
the CCP in the wake of oppression, the consolidation of political 
power was the primary goal of the politicalline, to prevent “peaceful 
evolution" by the Western capitalist countries. The implementation 
of the political reform became a means to maintain the incumbent 
political system and its main goals were to facilitate economic 
marketization and maintain societal stability. 
In the 1990s, the dilemma of the political structural reform was 
less complicated than that of the 1980s but the pace of the reform 
slowed down. The term political reform disappeared from the mass 
media for a while and it re-emerged only at the end of 1989. The 
goal and contents of the political reform had changed. The 
“separation" concept of the Party and government disappeared and 
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the strengthening of the Party leadership became the main threat in 
the new stage of political reform. Deng began to talk about the 
fine-tuning and perfecting “democratic centralism" within the Party, 
which means overt dissension from the Party would not be allowed. 
To avoid the repetition of the June 4 events, the center of the Party 
could not be split. There was no mention of the separation of the 
Party and govemment after the Political Report in the Fourteenth 
CCP in late 1992. The slogan had changed to the “perfection of 
socialist democracy" and the primary concem was with stability as 
the slogan went “stability must overwhelm everything." At the 
Fourteenth CCP Congress , the scope of the political structural 
reform was narrowed to streamlining the Party and state 
administration, to carrying out a new civil service system, and to 
promoting multi-party cooperation under CCP and spiritual 
civilization. 
In the 1980s, the main concem of Deng Xiaoping's notion of 
political structural reform was the separation of the Party and 
govemment, but the main focus in the 1990s, was on the efficiency, 
or effectiveness of the NPC and administrative body. Moreover, the 
CCP leadership emphasized the separation of the government from 
the enterprises, which means the administrative units should cease 
the intervention with the state enterprises. The move to separate the 
Party and government took a backward step comparing with 
separation of the Party with govemment.. Political power was more 
overtly concentrated. All the Standing Politburo Committee 
members filled the key Party/state posts. Jiang Zemin alone 
occupied the posts of the state presidency, the Party 
general-secretary and chairman of the CMC. Li Peng was the 
premier and Li Ruihuan became the chairman of the CPPCC and 
Qiao Shi the chairman of the NPC. The fusion of power or the 
concentrated power pattern had a beautiful name “cross leadership". 
The tradition has stayed until today. 
Notes: 
1 Since the early 1990s, students of Chinese politics have lost interests in the concept 
of cycles and the academic discussions have been on the notion of corporatism and 
civil society. See Wong Yiu-chung and Chan Che-po (2002) . 
Censorship was even applied to the foreign dignitaries . Hi l1ary Clinton's 
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autobiography Living Histoηwas translated into Chinese and published in the PRC in 
2003 . However, references to Harry Wu's imprisonment in China, 4 June events and 
human rights in China were deleted from the book (Apple 26 September 2003). Most 
interestingly, the Party newspaper People s Daily was censored by local authorities 
On 28 August 2003 , the edition of People s Daily carried an article titled “明而o tore 
down the building, but for whose profit?", criticizing 出e officials of Jiangxi province 
The edition did not appear until two days later and fo叮 pages were removed. 
3 1 and my colleague have done some empirical studies on the role of the Party 
secretary and the director in the state enterprises. See Wong Yiu-chung an-ct Chan 
Che-po (2002) 
4 The use of electronic media had been instrurnental in the dernise of the forrner 
Soviet Union. The spread of intemet in China had caused some observers to rnake a 
sirnilar prediction (Gordon Chang 2001). Would the Soviet expe口ence be repeated in 
China? For detailed analysis, see chapter 8 
5 For details in the number of staff in each ministry, commission and bureau, consuJt 
GOSC (1 995). However, the nurnber of personneJ in the Ministries of Defense, 
NationaJ Security, Public Security, Supervision and the Commission of National 
Science and TechnoJogy, Office of Taiwan Affairs and Office of the Press, was not 
released. Some statistics are very interesting. For example the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had the largest established staff (2000), foJlowed by the Ministry of Finance 
(950) and Ministry of Agriculture (925). However, a bureau dealing with patents has a 
staff of 1260 
6 The 10th NPC in March 2003 , at which Wen Jiabao was elected to be the premier, 
did not introduce any reform program in the State Council make up. Only two 
rninistries were cancelled 
7 Mark O'Neill (1 997). A vote for the village. South China Morning Post, 12 April 
8 According to Bai (2001) , his report was based on on-site observations and 
investigations and letters of appeal or disclosure to the departments of civiJ a旺airs. 1 
doubt very much that the Westem observers of the village elections could ever gain 
access to these letters 
9 According to a report of Southern Weekend, in city of Qianjiang in Guangdong, for 
the term from 1999 to 2002, in a total of 329 elected village heads and members, 187 
people were driven out of post because of ‘ incompetence' and 432 vice heads and 
members were removed illegally (Apple 27 September 2002) 
10 There was a debate as to whether the election of the township government head 
was constitutionaJ or not, because according to the Chinese constitution, the township 
head shouJd be elected by the corresponding level ofpeople 's congress not directly by 
出e people 
II However, in the 1990s even in one province Huipei officials cornmitting corruption 
amounted to 2244 officials. 718 cases involved amount rnore than 100 thousand YUan' 
59 cases between 500 thousand yuan and one million, 8 cases dealing more than 10 
million (The Mirror March 2001 :32) 
12 ln the 19905, thεt'w.O highε5t Party治tate leadεr5 who were convicte吐 of cormption 
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were CCP Politburo member the former Beíjíng mayor Chen Xítong and více 
chaírman of the SCNPC Cheng Kejíe. The híghest seníor officíal who was executed 
for the crime was více govemor of Jíangxí provínce Hu Changqing ín 1999. Chen's 
case, ín fact, was more polítícal nature 也an financial. The amount was more than a 
millíon yu血， the case was not so serious 臼 comp位ed wíth other corrupted officials 
Most belíeved that hís power struggles with Jíang Zemín caused hís downfall 
Cher嚕 's case involved more 也徊的 míllíon yuan 
13 Quoted from Hu Angang (2001) , pp.228-231 
14 One of the recent examples was the Shanghaí bíllíonaire Chou Chengyí. It was 
reported that he had conspired with the Shanghaí officíals in the 1990s to get hundred 
of hectares of urban land wíthout spending too much. He was able to borrow bíllíons 
of dollars 台om the banks through personal connections (Open July 2003:23-27) 
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